Compare that to secret information, which is known only to the parties using it to authenticate. Information about it was probably given to sales people and representatives at other companies, and transmitted insecurely over a variety of communication mediums. There are likely hundreds (if not thousands) of engineers who had access to the code or design documents that describe the scrambler. Obscure information is by its nature known to many people. There is a very significant fundamental difference between obscure information and secret information. In this case, hacking to get ahold of the scrambler is no different than getting ahold of the private part of a key pair. > I haven't seen anything that explains how scrambling and descrambling work but it's important to understand that, at a certain level, all encryption is "security by obscurity." It just comes down to how easy or hard it is to figure out how to bypass. I also wonder if disabling this system was "the straw that broke the camel's back?" If I were a developer and it suddenly became much harder to test, I'd probably think very critically if it's "worth it" to jump through so many hoops for such a small market. With revenues plummeting and the PS2 ogre coming out, developers abandoned the Dreamcast and SEGA retired from the hardware manufacturing business in order to focus on software. > SEGA quickly released a DC v2 which disabled MIL-CD altogether but unfortunately damage had been done. I haven't seen anything that explains how scrambling and descrambling work but it's important to understand that, at a certain level, all encryption is "security by obscurity." It just comes down to how easy or hard it is to figure out how to bypass.
Thus, this mechanism was probably used to burn games onto CDR for internal testing. Most likely, it was hard (or impossible) to burn a GD-ROM for internal testing. I doubt this was security through obscurity.
It turned out that the scrambler was nothing more than "security through obscurity". > The mashed potatoes problem was solved when a Katana SDK (the official Sega SDK for the Dreamcast) was stolen by the hacking team "Utopia" in late 1999. SEGA engineers knew that MIL-CD booting could be used as an attack vector so they added a protection.
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